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of History,
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In the context of the relation between history, activism, the image and capital, I would like to outline some topics that deal with capital, gender and positioning, i.e. with theory and history. My principal question is what kind of changes we can detect today in these paradigms, and, if possible, to rethink some old and new relations between theory, art practice and political activism.

1. The image

'How to squeeze the body and fill it with oil and vitriol?' – the body in Eastern European video art, the video works of Marina Grzinic/Aina Smid.

The position of the body in relation to history and theory in the so-called post-socialist, post-Communist or post-capitalist context can be grasped precisely in *Bilocation* (Grzinic/Smid, 1990). *Bilocation* is the simultaneous residence of the body and soul in two different places. The term is perfect for delineating the process of the video medium, and for describing history in relation to the body. In *Bilocation*, original documentary footage shot by TV Slovenia during the 'civil war' in Kosovo in 1989 (a territory in the south of the former Yugoslavia, racked by national unrest and conflicts between its Albanian and Serb populations) has been used and juxtaposed with the imaginary world of synthetic video images. The documentary footage, which had not been shown previously on national TV, is overlaid onto the image of a ballet dancer (e.g., inserted into her eye, encrusted in her intestines, etc.). These are images about (historical) places, where our own memories become at once psychotic and erotic.



Marina Grzinic/Aina Smid, *Bilocation*, 1990



Marina Grzanic/Aina Smid, *Three Sisters*, 1992



Marina Grzanic/Aina Smid, *Labyrinth*, 1993

In *Bilocation*, the body is prepared and embalmed as a body was prepared for a socialist parade, or a condemned man on his way to the scaffold. It is as if the culmination of every parade was not the excitement it aroused, but might just as well be a body—embalmed, glazed, and made up as a victim. When dressing them for the parade, we are actually adorning the body, which is soon to be destroyed by lust. The body is re-picturing the visual rituals of the body in the East and West. Are we remaking the body of history? No, it is rather a simulation of its political and emotional co-ordinates. The body is used against amnesia, shifting tenses in a way that deepens our understanding of memory and history beyond the video medium. However, it is not only this; the way the body is presented in *Bilocation* clearly shows that the body in video is only the video resolution.

Through an electronic and digital process of encrustation, a concrete destiny for the video medium—which in the 1990s relates to an entirely changed political and artistic context—is realized. Video works identify with the *Zeitgeist* of the War in the Balkans of the 1990s. The documentary shorts of the war are encrusted with constructed fictional material. Instead of simply identifying with a documentary about our present situation, the structures of electronic processes offer paradoxes and non-linear editing. Peace conferences to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina seemed to be constructed with equal skill, but without resolution. Through video and the processes of re-appropriation, such as recycling different histories and cultures, a multicultural hybrid aesthetic condition is provided. This is an attempt to create empathy where apathy reigns, and to create anxiety without ecstasy.

The video *Three Sisters* (Grzanic/Smid, 1992), presents a different visualization of the classic play by Anton Chekhov, and relates to a radically altered political and artistic context. It can also be understood as an attempt to discuss the disintegration of Communism, as well as racism, nationalism, and the new political machinery of free-market capitalism. It contains, for instance, a remake of a famous Benetton commercial. It also explores the relationship between Chekhov and Eisenstein (referring to *Battleship Potemkin*) and between Chekhov



Marina Grzanic/Aina Smid, *Luna 10*, 1994

and De Palma (referring to the film *The Untouchables*). The video is like a virtual explosion of the 'rotating swastika'; splinters from the explosion take us into the very innards of the post-Communist condition, a condition saturated not only with 'blood and mud,' cadavers and monsters, but also with the most ludicrous utopias, visions and strategies, as well as a consciousness of the Apocalypse, and the self at the end of the millennium.

In *Three Sisters*, the last act of disobedience perpetrated by the stereotypical transvestite body (the same as the heroine of Liliana Cavani's *Night Porter*) is her line at the end of the video: 'I shall live.' The strategy is not to make fakes, but to develop tactics of political and aesthetic articulation of one true reality and the politics of resistance, as perhaps Homi K. Bhabha would say, around a specific kind of subject that is constructed at the point of disintegration. Here I will turn on its head Godard's re-formulation of the French *Nouvelle Vague*. Godard said, 'It is not blood, it is red.' A kind of traumatic reality is emerging through the surface of video in the post-Communist era.

In *Labyrinth* (Grzanic/Smid, 1993), we see the juxtaposition of artificially constructed surrealist imagery based on Magritte's work (e.g., *Young Girl Eating a Bird*, *The Heart of the Matter*, *The Lovers*, etc.), and documentary footage from the refugee camps where Bosnian refugees live in Ljubljana. The video recycles different histories and cultures. We witness a disturbing psychological game played out between the striptease dancer and the audience; the story in the video goes beyond simple questions of identity, forging kinship. It is not so much to show the body as something else, but rather the idea of dealing with, or living with and through, contradictions. This means that it is not a question only of losing the body, but actually getting it back through a process of rethinking the place where the body was/is engendered.

The bodies that featured in the video works of Eastern Europe are not only mapped as territories, not just producing a kind of intersection of outer and inner space, nor of vis-

ibility and invisibility, but were reconstructed and re-invented again and again within the video medium. From them, we tried to squeeze out monumental effects—to make them modern relics, sexual fetishes, encrusted and filled with substances such as oil, blood and vitriol. As metaphorical territories, these bodies condensed history and a strategy of suspense, so that we may wonder to which history the faces belong, and to whom these bodies were delivered. The bodies were/are chains of eternal replacement of meaning, in the same way that history is itself articulated by partially readable races and bodies.

At the end of the millennium, the body has found itself in the chaos of fear, pain and wars—attacked and decentralised. Above all, it is a fleeting physical-material fact. A credit-card-sized processor has taken over our materiality. With a single key, we can plug into any high-tech appliance. And so our dreams of going somewhere far away, of escaping our nothingness, are realized here by reversals of the body in time and space and space in time. It is clear how a tremendous impact can be achieved by technically reversing the linearity of time. Sometimes a backward move by the simplest video switch is the best measure of our feelings and thoughts. This is the case in the video *Luna10*, from 1994.

‘Everything, everywhere, everybody’ is the slogan of the ’90s that results in a confusion of bodies, concepts and strategies—a type of out-of-joint situation for the subject. We find ourselves within all media, in all bodies, in all possible spaces at once. This brings into question some fundamental arguments about art and culture, and also reveals other internal media and social processes. We are faced with leaving a historically defined position, which irritates the natural world of our senses. With new media and technology, we have the possibility of an artificial interface, dominated by non-identity, or difference (Peter Weibel). Instead of producing a new identity, something much more radical is produced: *the total loss of identity*. The subject is itself, but also somebody/something else.

On the other hand, when misrepresentation forms a fictitious path, the video medium allows the display and analysis of the manipulation and duplication of history to demonstrate the purpose of psychology. Against the ideology of psychology that reigns today, Grzinic and Smid use a procedure of common clichés. Each sentence and image is a cliché from a B-movie, yet somehow the trivial dimension of these clichés is lost and subdued into a metaphysical depth. Identity is represented, not through the psychology of an individual, but through the formation of a new visual and cultural space, via the recycling of stereotypes. What we are witnessing is the act of taking possession of documents, photographs, images, faces and bodies, which are constantly produced as types, stereotypes and prototypes. Consequently, there is no psychology, except when it is a constituent part of a ‘quotation’ or ‘stereotype’. The psychological unity of a person disintegrates into a series of clichés and ritualized behavior. The use of quotations and recycling methods raise questions about originality and repetition, reality and media simulation. The overall effect

of this return to cliché is that people are strangely de-realized, or rather de-psychologized. Similarly, in the video work entitled *Irwin: Transcentrala*, the body is an artifact cobbled together from other artifacts, rather than from a profound life experience. In contrast to the mass-media idea that the body connected with new media achieves a natural totality, processes of post-socialist visualization of the subject, and of the body in the media, underline this artificial, constructed and unnatural human body, and its thoughts and emotions. One way of reading this is that the effect of de-realization comes from juxtaposing reality and its phantasmagoric supplement face to face; one parallel to the other. The idea is to put together the quotidian social reality and parallel it with its phantasmagoric supplement. Something similar was done in the year 2000 in the exhibition in Paris on Eastern European Art, where the Russian artist Kabakov displayed the reconstruction of the kitchen in Soviet times, and through the window of this reconstructed kitchen it was possible to watch the delirious films from the golden Soviet age, full of a bright future and smiling faces, eager to work, to combat. The Soviet ideal of a simple, poor kitchen was aligned with its phantasmagoric counterpart through films and visual ideology. This procedure allowed us to externalize our innermost fantasies in all their inconsistency. In cyberspace these traumatic scenes, which not only never really happened, but were never even consciously fantasized, have an even a more important role, showing clearly that the real is a purely virtual entity, which has no positive ontological consistency.

But this is only one level of rethinking the situation. Visualizations with film and imagining technologies show clear ideological boundaries, and constitute safe ‘distance-proximity relations’ in the real world and its phantasmic film scenarios.

Remember that the military commander Ripley from the blockbuster film *Alien* had to use a lot of strength to get rid of the too-loving Alien creature in the sequel no. 4 of the film, released in 1999-2000. The creature recognized that Ripley was its biological mother, which was possible only because Ripley, in defiance of the previous three films, was a clone, i.e. an artificially procreated human entity, not the true human woman she was in all the previous films.

This biological mother had to destroy the Alien, yet the love gesture of the Alien was both morbid, and extremely romantic and empathetic. In the world of high technology, cloning and bio-chips, the empathic relation between two monsters (or a cyborg cloned) human and the monster tell us more about social relations, social interactions and the politics of love in the real world, than any other type of sexual relationship between humans, whatever their sexual orientation and preferences.

Ripley, despite being cloned, was still too human, and therefore problematic to fit into the science-fiction story. In the movie industry, it is still unacceptable to portray a relationship between a human and a semi-human. This applies to the first cyber-cloning film, *Bladerunner*; the

relationship between Harrison Ford and the heroine Rachel functions smoothly as they are both replicants, which is why they function as a perfect realization of the phantasmic loving couple (both being almost identical to human beings, although not being them).

The logic of the sexual revolution) is as follows: love, empathy and sexual relations between the mucous micro-organism-modeled substance and the human being in the movie industry is not yet consummated, but always stops at the point of strategic distance I will call the safety distance. To keep a sanitary boundary between us and the formless other conforms to the ideology that, while we can produce other live entities, we will not have sex or complete empathy with them. Is not such a safe-distance relationship similar to the one offered by the ethical middle class with the so-called third world? Through UNICEF and similar organizations, they may send \$1 each month for an African kid, and thus allow the kids to survive—but it is questionable if they can not just survive, but also live.

The relationship is extremely empathic, if we judge from the letters full of love and thanks written by the African children. But it is absolutely abstract, does not require any kind of real contact, and is quite incapable of transmitting contagious illness or similar. As with the alien in *Alien 4*, while searching for love and tenderness everyone stays at a safe distance: the safety distance teach us, who are the mothers of the monsters, how real children have to look, and what are the borders of our sexual/paternal/maternal lust.

2. Theory: capitalism

Multiculturalism is the cultural logic of global capitalism, as new spiritualism is its ideology. Multiculturalism is not about innovation, but about abstract multiplication. This is why global capitalism needs particular identities. In this triangle of global-multicultural-spiritual, the post-political must be seen not as the conflict between global and national ideological visions represented by competitive parties, but as abstract collaboration. As Jacques Rancière developed in his theory of the post-political, it is about the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, lawyers, public opinion experts) and liberal multiculturalists. This absolutely abstract way in which art institutions function is at the same time the international legitimization of the enlightened technocrats of post-socialism by multiculturalists. This collaboration shows a radical discord between the effects of resistance and the institutions and mechanisms of power that provoke them, and the complicity of power, private capital and thought with mastery. The true horror today is not horrifying violent projects in the arts, since they function, paradoxically, as a protective shield that has to be fantasized, protecting us from the true horror—the abstract positioning of East and West. The psychosis-generating experience is that this abstract collabora-

tion protects in the end only, and obscenely visibly, the institution in itself, and erases all traces of difference, positioning, etc. The art institution's defense against the true threat is to stage a bloody, aggressive, destructive threat in order to protect the abstract, sanitized situation. This demonstrates the absolute inconsistency of the phantasmic support, as well. Instead of the multiple-reality talk, as who else but Slavoj Žižek would say, one should thus insist on a different aspect—on the fact that the phantasmic support of the reality of the art institution is in itself multiple and inconsistent! We have a triangle of global-multicultural-spiritual, and on the other side, capitalism-democracy-ethics.

Absolute profanation and secularization are important processes, initiated by capitalism itself. This logical inversion may be summarized in the words of Baudrillard: “After all, it was capitalism which, throughout history, fed on the destruction of every reference, every human objective, which completely loosened every differentiation between false and real, good and evil, in order to introduce a radical law of equivalence and exchange, the iron law of its power. Capitalism was the first to perform intimidation, abstraction, de-territorialization, non-connectedness, etc. (. . .) Nowadays this logic is turning against it. And when it tries to fight against this spiraling catastrophe, by concealing the last gleam of reality in which it was supposed to be the last thunder of power, it only multiplies the signs and accelerates the play of simulation.” (Baudrillard, “The Precession of Simulacra,” in: *Art and Text*, Spring 1983, p. 28).

Alain Badiou argues that does not matter: if this disintegration is going on in an almost barbaric way, still it has, as Baudrillard in the 1980s was already implying, some ontological value. The processes of disintegration brought into question the myth of the presence and the fetish of the absolute ONE. The mechanics of capitalism show that the essence of presence is multi-layered, multiplicitous. It is necessary to take the inconsistency produced by capitalism as an inconsistency of the multiplicity in itself. On the other hand democracy is, according to Badiou, just an economic democracy, connected with nothing else than bureaucracy and totalitarianism. Democracy is a norm, inscribed in the relation of the subjects to the state, that fosters solely state principles of a minimum of consensus regarding the economy and the state's functionality. State democracy, argues Badiou, is constantly perpetuating the consensual organization of community and the law of normality which, according to him, is the way of researching and disseminating the norm. It is always a situation for a codex of normatively imposing regulations about what multiplicity is. Badiou calls this process of establishing and perpetuating the norm “counting for the One,” which is always a result and not a process.

The elimination of counting for the One is, therefore, the most important process in the realm of art and politics: a process of invention, a new way of acting today. And here is where ethics enter the arena. Here we can see the importance of the law of total secularization, also fostered by capitalism. The process questions this counting for the One, exposing the

inconsistency of the One. The inconsistency here can be seen as a parallel process to what I referred to above, in relation to Slavoj Žižek, as the inconsistency of the real world and its phantasmic scenarios. In short, although nothing can diminish the importance of the proposed break with counting for the One, capitalism has destroyed, permanently fragmented, the structure of the institution of the One in theory and philosophy too. Now philosophy, as in Minerva's owl story from the German philosopher Hegel—(Hegel said that Minerva's owl takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering. In other terms: wisdom alas comes too late. ...),—is trying to give a rational outline to the process of fragmentation, not to get rid of the historical philosophical edifice that was grounded in the One.

The ethical stance has nothing to do, according to Badiou, with the politics of representation. In ethics the subject stands alone and speaks for itself. And philosophy of art will have a chance to rearticulate the position of art and its practice in relation to politics if it is in a position to elaborate concepts that show what the state and its cultural and democratic institutions conceived as impossible. Insisting on the impossible is a way to eliminate counting for the One. Ethics, according to Badiou, is *Realpolitik*.

3. History

I would like to start with a theoretical-political positioning of feminist theory and practice, and move on to the relation between philosophy and cyberfeminism. In this my intention is to outline philosophically and articulate a particular Eastern European position; not grounded in the simple game of identity politics, whereby specific women search for their rights to colonize cyberspace, but rather a militant response to the constant process of fragmentation and specialization. More, I specify the re-politicization of the cyberworld on the basis that it is not a geographical space or location on the map of the 'New Europe', but as E. Said would say, a concept.

My rethinking of the position of (post-)feminism and gender theories today is also a direct answer to the frequent populist remarks that today is no time to divide East and West Europe, and that due to globalization it is only home that matters: "No East, no West, home's best!" Despite the ideological blindness of such a sentence (which fails to take into account the claustrophobic tendency and totalitarian flavor intrinsic to every ideology of internalism), again we have to ask: where is this home? In which spiritual and conceptual context is it situated, if indeed we have one!

Instead of reflecting myself as an academically positioned woman, and therefore a (cyber)feminist from Eastern Europe, I propose a radical reversal of this, to articulate my real Eastern

European position (or if you prefer making a reference to Lyotard postmodern condition, my postsocialist condition) as a post-feminist/ cyberfeminist paradigm. Eastern Europe can be seen as the female side in the process of sexual difference and grounding ourselves in the real or cyberworld. It is rooted in a much deeper universal demand for identity, politics, strategy and tactics for action, theoreticization, emancipation and uselessness. It can be perceived as the militant theoreticization of a particular position in the crucial debate, at the start of the third millennium, concerning ways and means and last but not least protocols for entering the (cyber)space of hopes, uselessness, theory and terror.

To return to radical politics means to demand universality, and not to be squeezed into the narrowly confined politics of constant exaggeration and constantly renewed identities and needs. This is crucial to an understanding of the changing position of the self and identity. What becomes apparent here is that the relation of the subject in front of the computer console with her body, history, geography, space, etc. takes on a kind of indirect communication with the excrescence behind her, mediated by the third gaze of the computer. What is at stake here is the temporal loss of the subject's symbolic identity: *she* is forced to perceive that *she* is not what she thought she was. Geographical and organizational politics may also be attached to the logistics of space for this somebody-something else: we can be taken elsewhere and nowhere.

As Peter Lamborn Wilson, alias Hakim Bey, stated in the lecture at the Nettime symposium "Beauty and the East" in Ljubljana in 1997, it seems that the second world is erased, and what is left are the first and third worlds. Instead of the second world, Bey argued, there is a chasm from which one jumps into the third. I will call this chasm "The Matrix of Monsters," a parody of the title of the Nettime conference "Beauty and the East" (which was itself a paraphrase of the fairytale title "Beauty and the Beast"). When it comes to the differences between East and West, it is clear that the Internet users from the black hole, the Eastern Europeans, want not just to mirror "the developed capitalist societies," but to articulate and interpret, or better, to improve, their rightful position in this changed constellation.

"The Monsters" insist on difference—a critical internal difference, not a special classification marking basic differences, such as apartheid, as Trinh T. Minh-ha suggests. The question of who is allowed to write about the history of art, culture and politics in the area once known as Eastern Europe has to be posed, along with the questions of how and when these events are marked. The following questions are crucial, as formulated by Yvonne Volkart: "Which spaces do subjects and agents cross when they communicate? What do they call themselves? Are they subjects, cyborgs, monsters, nomads or simply hackers?" (Yvonne Volkart "Stubborn Practices" in *The Age of Information and Biotechnology*, written as part of her curatorial project *Tenacity: Cultural Practices in the Age of Information*

and *Biotechnology*, presented at the Swiss Institute, New York, 2000 and at the Stedhale, Zurich, 2000). We have to ask ourselves what space, which actors, whose agents and what subjects? Let us jump into the actual space of Europe, as discussed on the Internet via vital lists that are developing a critical view on media and the world, such as the Net-time list or the Syndicate list, etc. There one may read (and respond to) some interesting contributions on Eastern Europe that I will synthesize thus: “despite the initial euphoria Western Europe showed for Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern Europe has failed. It has not managed to put itself on the map of important political, cultural arts events in Europe.” The disappointment about Eastern Europe’s failure to become a stable society may also be detected in the works of such prominent philosophers as Badiou and Rancière.

It is true that the main presentation of the last Documenta in Kassel (dX in 1997) included only two or three artists from Eastern Europe. And if we’re to believe the interview with the curator (Catherine David), this was because there was in fact nothing to select. The void, or the de facto elimination, of the Eastern European artist from the Documenta was, according to her, the result of a void specific to Eastern Europe, not a result of selection. It seems that Eastern Europe has been lost for the second time, after it was just in the process of being rediscovered in 1989, as stated here: if the woman does not exist, this is because she cannot be refound (Joan Copjec, *Read my Desire. Lacan against the Historicists*, MIT Press, 1994, p. 221).

In Slavoj Žižek’s interpretation, the negative gesture by the Eastern Europeans who said no to the Communist regime is very important—practically crucial—to an understanding of what has occurred to catalyze this later failed positivism. For Lacan, negativity is a condition of either the impossibility or possibility of the later enthusiastic identification—it lays the base for it.

What is Eastern Europe after the fulfilment of its destiny, nearly a decade since the fall of the Berlin Wall?

A similar question is raised by Žižek through Lacan. In his reading of the Oedipal myth, Lacan focused on the field which is, in most usual readings of the Oedipal complex, left out: what is beyond Oedipus—what is Oedipus himself after he has fulfilled his destiny? A question that may be posed after watching such films as *Bladerunner* or *Seven*. What happens when life resumes its usual rhythm? As Lacan put it in *Seminar II*, from the beginning of the tragedy, everything leads us to the fact that following the fulfilment of his symbolic destiny (i.e., when Oedipus unknowingly kills his father and marries his mother), Oedipus is merely an empty husk, a remnant, a creature robbed of all purpose. He is the embodiment of what Lacan calls *plus-de-jour*, the surplus enjoyment that cannot be explained by any symbolic idealization.

What we have here is a field that may be described in psychoanalysis as the field between two deaths, the symbolic and the real. The ultimate horror is this limbo, which Lacan called lamella, as an immortal yet indestructible object, i.e., a life voided from the symbolic structure.

It seems that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern Europe found itself in a position similar to that of Oedipus, a horrible intermediate position, whereby it has been changed into an inseparable remainder, a substanceless crumb of reality that has already swallowed all the potential generated by its previous existence. But—and this is crucial to an understanding of the changed, so-called failed position of Eastern Europe—when Lacan uses the plus-de-jour notion, he is playing with the *double entendre* of the French term, comprising simultaneously ‘surplus’, and ‘no more’ Oedipus, having fulfilled his destiny, is *plus d’homme*, which means both ‘surplus man’ and ‘no longer a man’. He is a conditional man; a human monster, and as such, a paradigmatic example of the modern subject, since his monstrosity is structural, not accidental.

In keeping with this definition, we may define Eastern Europe as ‘*plus d’Europe orientale*’. Eastern Europe is ‘surplus to Europe’ (as it was before the fall of the Berlin Wall too: not European enough), and ‘no longer Europe’. It is therefore forced to accept the position of a turd. (Please allow me to digress here and state that this is not necessarily a bad thing. From the limbo/lamella view—“the modern subject does not exist without an understanding that from some other perspective I am a piece of shit”—we may say that this is actually the first condition required for Eastern Europe to take on all the characteristics of a modern subjectivity. From its inherently excremental position, Eastern Europe can arise or finally be perceived as a subject. As Žižek writes: “If the Cartesian subject wants to arise on the level of enunciation, it must be described as almost nothing, ready to be thrown in the garbage as a statement.” Perhaps only now, when Eastern Europe has reached almost rock-bottom (and wasn’t it, among others, Documenta that reduced us to this?), can it arise to express itself. In that case, we have a split between utterance and statement. If the Cartesian subject wishes to express itself, then it must be turned into shit. This is the zero-point of subjectivity: we begin to be something once we have been absolutely nothing.)

Furthermore, the classical ontology focuses on the triad of the truthful, the beautiful and the good. For Lacan, these three notions push the boundaries, and show that good is the mask of diabolical evil (e.g., Oleg Kulik, the Russian artist dog, or the performances entitled *Was ist Kunst?* by the artist Rasa Todosijevic from Belgrade. In the 1970s, Todosijevic literally tried to drag the answer to: what is art? out of women by force, slapping their faces with black greasepaint in a shocking display of body-art) Beauty masks ugliness (e.g., Irwin’s series of 100 pictures, also entitled *Was ist Kunst?* In this series, and in the exhibitions of Laibachkunst, supposed Nazis are portrayed along with members of the banned Laibach group; they are engraved into the iconography of the paintings, as their

busts or torso sculptures decorate numerous paintings of the *Was ist Kunst?* project. And that truth masks the central void, around which gravitates every symbolic structure (e.g., the Romanian flag, after the so-called Romanian Revolution, with a hole instead of the star). In short, writes Zizek, there is a field beyond the good, the beautiful and the true, which is not filled with banalities, but presents a terrifying source for the good, the beautiful and the true. All the greatest catastrophes of our century, from Stalinism to the Holocaust, are the result not of being seduced by the morbid attraction of the beyond, but, on the contrary, of our constant efforts to elude meeting it, and instead to install the reign of truth and good.

When Lacan argued that truth has the structure of fiction, and lacks totality, he highlighted the fact that in in these two moments (fiction and a lack of totality), truth touches the real. The Eastern European Monsters Matrix has the status of not-all and the structure of fiction precisely because it is part of the order of the Real. So it is not surprising that theoreticians (Peter Weibel, for one) spoke about Eastern Europe as a generator of concepts in the field of art and culture that are connected with a traumatic reality. What we can learn from the positioning of the two matrices, as with the formulae of *sexual* difference, is that in post-Communism, a kind of traumatic reality is emerging through the surface of the works. "It is not red, it is blood," is the indivisible post-Communist remnant that it is not (yet?) possible to re-integrate into the global immaterial and virtual media world.

4. Conclusion

In this final part of the essay I would like to connect the two poles: Alain Badiou's proposal to stop counting for the One, and the premiss that, instead of thinking of the Other in relation to the One, we have to operate with the Other as Two. If we see the Eastern Europe paradigm as the female position, it is precisely because of this proposed changed position of the Other. If we think of a woman as the Other, it is because we now have to count from one to two. That means that in the long-term philosophical rethinking of the Western tradition, the total fragmentation of any monolithic edifice offers a chance for Eastern Europe to be understood as Two.

To consider the theory of the Other as TWO also constitutes a possible radical positioning for other worlds, paradigms of thinking etc., outside the Western capitalist worlds. Thus these others, the Other, are not to be seen simply as a couple or a twin (which was the main interpretation of the woman as the other part of the male-female couple, or the twin soul of man: similarly, Eastern Europe was understood as just the mirror image of the Western Europe, or an alternative aspect of it), but as TWO.

But let's go step by step, to explain in details the process described above. To do this I will make an extensive reference to Alenka Zupancic's text "Nietzsche and Nothingness."

According to this theory, the One is in a disproportionate relationship with the Other. When we juxtapose them, it is obvious that the One needs the Other, but only because it needs to establish a boundary line: beyond that, there is no relationship between them. Truth functions similarly in relation to semblance: truth is all that is not a semblance, and vice versa. When we put them together it is a unity, but one that will not give us any third possibility: in such a relationship the Other is just a negative of the One. But we can give another interpretation: the Other is not to the opposite of the One, but Two. That means we don't have the dialogue of affirmation and negation, but two parallel dialogues which are not alternatives to each other, but both present at the same time! In such a constellation, the history of the world is not the history of the lost mythical One, but the history of the double source. In this way Eastern Europe, perceived as TWO, could be one of the sources. To refer back to the first part of this essay, I would like to remind you that, to be present at the same time, not to alternate between one and the other, is also one of the artistic strategies possible today, with the effect of radical de-realization: juxtaposing reality and its phantasmic supplement face to face, parallel one to the other. The idea is to put together the aseptic, quotidian social reality and parallel it with its phantasmic supplement.

And even more: to say that the Other is Two is not to explain the difference between the One and the Other, but to point up the difference immanent *in* the Other. The third possibility is the Other of the Other, which means that the surplus of two is not the third, but that this surplus stays, already inherent in the Other; the two of the Other remaining internal to it. Thus the Other of the Other is not the double or the repetition of the One.

So it is an inherent self-referential moment in the Other that makes it a non-whole. This is why woman, truth and Eastern Europe are perceived as Other, as non-whole. Not because it contains some lie, always a part of truth, nor because something is missing in the woman, nor because Eastern Europeans really aren't at the level of Westerners, but because when truth tells the truth, or woman says she isn't whole, both are telling a truth inherent in them, which is already a part of their performance. Beware: the condition and positioning as a non-whole is not a real failure.

The third possibility is not the third possibility at all, if you perhaps imagine I want to propose something like the famous Third ay in socialism It is the Other of the Other, the self-referential moment already generated through language. This is the guarantee of truth, of woman, of Eastern Europe.

The homophony between Eastern European space, truth and woman means that woman is not an aspect of man, Eastern Europe is not simply the distorted mirror or even better

an aspect of the West. Although it can be: insofar as the West wants to see it that way, and as far as Eastern Europe fulfils Western Europe's phantasmic desire. It is possible to say the same of a woman. She can be an aspect of man, but that is not, according to Zupancic, what defines her Nor is Eastern Europe as an aspect of the West what defines its ontological status.

Moreover, if the woman or Eastern Europe were only that, it would be possible to state that a sexual relationship exists. Instead we have a phantasmic scenario in the place of the sexual relationship, and also in the area that is covered by Eastern Europe. We have to get rid of the temptation to define a woman on the basis of what a man is not in order to be included in the discourse. That allows for the description of woman, and Eastern Europe, as mute territories in which the loud discussions and desires of man and Westerners are going on. As conditional on this, the woman is perceived (by Badiou, for example) as a fixed silence in which the articulation of phallic enjoyment occurs. One can say much the same of the way Badiou is rethinking Eastern Europe. Its revolution in the '90s was/is perceived by him and others as a failure, although the fact that much of the revolutionary process was achieved by civilians, rather than by the state apparatuses, gave contemporary French political philosophy a slightly more positive view of Eastern Europe's position.

But as you know, I stated that the logic of the non-whole, the Other perceived as Two, actually predicates a third possibility, and according to Zupancic, this third possibility can be seen as the affirmation of the Other. I also stated that Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall is in the position of a piece of shit, and that this is not necessarily a bad thing.

Yet it seems we have a paradox. How can the status of woman, and Eastern Europe, as a not-all, non-whole position'—or more extremely, according to Lacan, as non-existent—be seen as a Hollywood success story of affirmation, rather than negativity? You may say this is not true, it is an error! Or maybe not...

The Other does not simply exist According to Zupancic, it evolves This is why it is possible to say: woman does not exist. This is the crucial difference between the One and the Other, between woman and man, between the East and the West. Even more, as formulated by Zupancic: The Other is just the name for becoming Two!

And Badiou errs because he reads the non-whole in a different way: that the Other is the name for becoming one with the One. I will just precis his important statement: "The Other's enjoyment is a silence within which the articulation of phallic enjoyment is going on. The Other is becoming one with the One. The Other is the negativity that serves to articulate the One."

But this is quite different from what Lacan said. For him, the One has nothing to do with evolution; it's about getting power from the signifier that affirms itself in the process of naming.

It doesn't exist as a genesis, nor an evolution towards the One. The One exists, so to speak, with a mandate, because of a decree, an order. As Zupancic said, the One exists with a punch, on a blow.

That means, to put it very briefly (and this is where Badiou is absolutely right), that counting for the One will never take us to Two. Counting as a way to arrive at the Other is a masculine way, the way Western Europe functions. It counts, one, two, three states will be part of the Whole of Western Europe. The counted states are just the object of Western Europe's phantasm. But from our viewpoint, the Other is defined by the fact that we start to count at two; two is the first number. And here is where Lacan and Badiou come very close. Two is not 1+1 This is why, instead of saying it is the other, Lacan says it is two.

And this is exactly where we can see the possibility for a different articulation of Eastern Europe, and of woman as well.

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Quaderns portàtils
ISSN: 1886-5259

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Proofreading by Cathy Douglas
Design by Cosmic <www.cosmic.es>




Pça. dels Àngels, 1
08001 Barcelona (Spain)
T. + 34 93 412 08 10
F. + 34 93 324 94 60
www.macba.es

Dr. Marina Grzinic (1958) is philosopher, artist and theoretician. She lives in Ljubljana, Slovenia and works in Ljubljana and Vienna. Grzinic is researcher at the Institute of Philosophy at the ZRC SAZU (Scientific and Research Center of the Slovenian Academy of Science and Art) in Ljubljana. She is Professor at the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna. She also works as freelance media theorist, art critic and curator. Marina Grzinic has been involved with video art since 1982. In collaboration with Aina Smid, Grzinic produced more than 40 video art projects, a short film, numerous video and media installations, several websites and an interactive CD-ROM (ZKM, Karlsruhe, Germany). She also has published hundreds of articles and essays and several books. <www.grzinic-smid.si>

On February 2001, Marina Grzinic was invited to give a conference at MACBA in the context of the seminar *Phantom History. Image, politics, history* celebrated as part of the film maker Pere Portabella's exhibition *Histories without a Plot*. This lecture was entitled "Spectralization of the History, spectralization of the Image, spectralization of Europe".

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


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
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
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